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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The last 50 years of development economics have seen hopes for global 
development raised high and dashed time and again.  While there has been positive, 
sometimes even impressive, growth in many countries, in most of the world 
experience has not matched expectations.  The accumulation of physical capital and 
human capital, liberalisation and privatisation have all been proposed as the elixirs of 
growth.  While all these arguments have some merit, by themselves they are 
incomplete solutions to the problem of development. The disappointing performance 
of the post-Communist transition, the slow growth of the 1970s and 80s in Africa and 
Latin America, and the Asian financial crisis of the 1990s were all rooted in poor 
governance.  Good governance involves aligning the incentives of agents with the 
interests of principals in both economic and political spheres.  This paper describes 
some insights from New Institutional Economics on how best to design these 
incentives.   
The ‘Washington consensus’ in the 1980s urged developing country 
governments to liberalise their banking systems, privatise inefficient state 
enterprises, and reform their tax structures—all of which were causes of serious 
fiscal problems—and this advice was likewise passed on to the post-Communist 
countries of Europe and Asia in the early 1990s.  However, such liberalisation, 
privatisation, and tax reforms in fact created serious instability, inequity and 
inefficiency, because they were carried out without the regulatory and legal 
frameworks, and government rules and structures, that make banking systems, 
corporate governance, and tax collection work effectively in advanced industrial 
countries.  Some of the most useful applications of NIE are to show what institutions 
are required to make the standard economic policy advice actually work in practice. 
In contrast to the old institutional economics, which was focused on case studies of 
organisation and preference formation, the New Institutional Economics (hence NIE) 
combines economic theory with the analysis of institutions.  In contrast to the old 
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institutional economics, New Institutional Economics does not have any disconnect with 
mainstream economics on the paradigm of the nearly rational, nearly self-interested 
individual.  Rather, the main message of NIE is that economic activity is plagued with 
transactions costs and collective action problems. These transactions costs include 
uncertainty about the trustworthiness of sellers or borrowers and administrative costs that 
are borne to reduce these uncertainties.  These transactions costs can be mitigated, and 
the scope for markets expanded, by establishing appropriate institutions, defined as rules 
and the enforcement of rules.  Rules that are written and enforced by the state are called 
formal rules.  Rules that are unwritten and enforced by groups within society are called 
informal rules. 
To take a concrete example, people may not be willing to lend because they do not 
expect to be paid back.  Institutions such as commercial laws providing for lenders to be 
paid back in the order in which they lent money to the debtor, and predictable law 
enforcement, might increase the willingness of lenders to lend money to borrowers.  The 
market for loans is also augmented by good collateral laws.  Similar arguments can be 
made for the development of equity markets.  More sophisticated versions of these 
arguments can be used to show the potential benefits of group lending in the context of 
microfinance.  In the context of international financial flows, bank fiduciary requirements 
and corporate governance may reduce financial risks for international investors, as well 
as the financial exposure of developed-country governments that de facto insure many 
such investors.   
The paper is organised as follows: I begin by describing Williamson’s (1999) 
hierarchy of institutions: social structure and human motivations that take centuries to 
evolve, political institutions that take decades to gel, legal institutions that take years to 
be legislated, and the use of law by private parties that can be established over much 
shorter periods.  I then discuss each of these sets of institutions following the order of 
Williamson’s hierarchy. 
 
2.  A HIERARCHY OF INSTITUTIONS: SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND  
HUMAN MOTIVATIONS, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, LEGAL 
INSTITUTIONS, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Several layers of institutions are important for institutional development and 
economic performance.  These layers, from the slowest moving to the fastest moving are: 
human motivations and social institutions, political institutions, legal institutions and 
private institutions (Figure 1). 
While there is an extent to which all these institutions are endogenous, there are 
two reasons why we ascribe causality from social structure to political institutions, 
political institutions to legal institutions, and legal institutions to the use of law by private 
parties.  First, an institution that changes more quickly is more likely to change in 
response to a slow-moving institution than vice versa.  Second, there is a clear sense in 
which political institutions (like legislatures and executives) affect legal institutions (like 
laws and their enforcement); and legal institutions (like commercial laws) affect how 
private parties use these laws. 
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Fig. 1.  A Hierarchy of Institutions [Williamson (1999)] 
 
Human motivations and Social structure  Evolves over centuries.  
Medieval social structures in Italy are closely related to modern social 
structures and economic performance (Putnam).  
 
Political Institutions Take decades to gel.  Democracies laid the 
foundations of property rights and protecting citizens and merchants from 
the state (North, Olson). 
 
Legal Institutions Take years to be legislated from thought to finish.  
Establishing the rule of law (including its effective enforcement) can take 
longer. The impact of democracy on corruption is much clearer for stable 
democracies that have been democratic for several decades (Treisman). 
 
Private Institutions Contracts can be negotiated over weeks even days. 
 
 Resource allocation, economic activity and welfare 
 
3.  HUMAN MOTIVATIONS AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 
Let’s begin with human motivations and social structure.  These include the extent 
to which: people in society care about each other’s welfare; citizens are imbued with 
civic virtue that motivates them to follow politics and vote in elections; public officials 
and school teachers are motivated by something other than wealth maximisation; the 
social networks that exist among people in similar professions and across classes and 
professions; and the extent of ethnic diversity and income inequality in society.   
In his eloquent new account of development “Development as freedom” (1999), 
Amartya Sen has argued that human beings define themselves and are motivated by what 
they do as much as what they consume.  Rather than merely using our capabilities to earn 
wages and consume goods, we also use our entitlements to develop our capabilities.  
Excelling at using our capabilities gives us as much satisfaction as consuming goods.  
Even though it may be cheaper to give large welfare payments to the handicapped rather 
than make every building wheelchair accessible as a way to maintain the consumption 
levels of the handicapped at reasonable levels, this may not be the optimal way to 
organise society, because it ignores the satisfaction the handicapped can get by doing 
their jobs well.  In the context of development this provides an argument for “trade not 
aid” or at least “open markets and institutional reform not handouts”.   
Economists’ narrow view of human behaviour that people are rational and selfish 
is useful when designing private institutions but not always helpful for the design of 
political institutions.  People do vote and in some societies civil servants do not take 
bribes when they are offered.  An empirically grounded theory of human motivations that 
is consistent with evolutionary arguments and makes useful and generally accurate 
predictions is sorely needed, but is no where near completion.  
One reason why such a theory is needed is to improve our understanding of social 
order. As mentioned above, the foundation of social order is the bedrock of development 
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and is contingent on the citizenry being politically engaged and willing to play fair.  
North, Summerhill and Weingast (2000) have an excellent theoretical statement on the 
foundations of social order and its application to the comparative development of North 
America and Latin America.  Social order consists of: 
 (1) A shared belief system about the rights and privileges of private parties and 
public institutions. 
 (2) The clear statement of these rights and privileges. 
 (3) Implicit or explicit incentive structures that prevent officials from exceeding 
the bounds of their authority—these include limited benefits from deviations, 
and fear of reprisal. 
 (4) A clear and shared understanding on the part of the population of what 
constitutes a deviation from expected behaviour, and a willingness to rebel or 
retaliate.  
 (5) A shared understanding of the legitimacy of rules and a widespread 
willingness to follow them, so that deviations are rare and can effectively be 
punished. 
Less dramatic versions of 4. could place some checks and balances on other 
branches of government, but there is some ultimate sense in which the answer to 
Juvenal’s question “Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?” (But who will guard the guardians?) 
is that a shared belief system among the citizenry about acceptable and unacceptable 
behaviour by the government and a willingness to punish an errant government is needed 
to keep the government honest.  
Constitutions inspired by the US constitution were adopted in Latin America but 
largely failed to firmly take hold.  The North American experience with self-government 
in the British colonies had led to a shared belief system about the proper role of 
government.  This, combined with the federal system, which made states compete with 
each other, limited the extent to which government would try to grab assets.  A peaceful 
and prosperous equilibrium was thus maintained till the civil war.  Latin America, by 
contrast, had little experience with democratic self-government until the 19th Century, 
and found that constitutions unsupported by belief systems and civic virtue, could neither 
constrain governments nor keep the peace. 
The reason that military coups are unthinkable in developed countries is that 
soldiers would not accept certain kinds of orders, even from their direct commanders.  
The oaths of allegiance soldiers take are not dissimilar.  It is a belief system on what is 
right and what is wrong that is the foundation for a reliably democratic social order.  One 
of the reasons for the frequency of military takeovers in Pakistan is that there is not a 
clear, unambiguous and strong antipathy to military governments.  Members of the armed 
forces are never socially shunned because of their involvement in military takeovers.  
Most Pakistanis would prefer a democracy but the strength of their feelings is not strong 
enough to prevent military takeovers. 
One of the insights in the work of North, Summerhill and Weingast is that in 
societies where there is a weaker consensus on what actions governments should and 
should not do, and a less engaged citizenry the role of government should be limited.  
While proactive government may work in Nordic countries, expanding the role of 
government elsewhere is likely to lead to pathological misgovernance.  The optimal level 
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of anti- trust activism and the complexity of competition policy are perhaps lower in 
developing countries.  Changing belief systems themselves while important is outside the 
scope of what aid project and donor assistance can reasonably achieve—with a few 
caveats listed below.  Crafting political institutions that can be realistically sustained by 
the available civic virtue is a more useful activity.   
Casari and Plott (2001) have an excellent experimental paper demonstrating how 
human vices such as spite might be harnessed to improve outcomes. They replicated a 
centuries-old institution used to protect common property resources in the Italian Alps, in 
a classroom laboratory.  This system, called “carte de regola,” rewards the discoverer of a 
violation with part of the fine charged to the violator.  This effectively harnesses the 
behaviour of spiteful agents, who spend resources identifying violators rather than over-
consuming, which they would otherwise do.  Casari and Plott find that there are spiteful 
agents who willingly engage in finding and punishing violators even when incentives 
aren’t strong enough for strictly rational agents to do so.  When incentives are sharpened 
to the point where even strictly rational agents would spend resources identifying 
violators, the efficiency of outcomes sharply increases.  One important lesson from this 
experiment is that rather than try to change human nature, smart institutional design 
should harness both selfishness and other morally questionable human qualities, such as 
ambition and spite, for socially useful purposes. 
Recent empirical research has linked history and geography through their effects 
on social structure to modern legal and political institutions [Easterly (1999), Engerman 
and Sokoloff (1998), Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2000)]. The comparative 
advantage of certain regions at producing certain kinds of goods (sugar, cotton) which 
had economies of scale in production, led to large inequalities in land, income and 
wealth.  Inequality, in turn, appears to affect several of the proximate causes of 
development, commercial laws, the rule of law, education levels and trade openness, and 
consequently economic performance.  Alternatively, settler mortality may have affected 
settlement patterns, the character of colonial institutions, and since these were inherited 
by post colonial states, modern day institutions.   
Some policy-makers are disheartened by such findings because history and 
geography cannot be changed.  But these findings do not imply that colonial origins, 
comparative advantage in producing certain goods, or religious makeup are destiny.  
They merely state that these things are correlated with the proximate causes of 
development today.  A society that chose to improve its performance on the proximate 
causes of development and enact better commercial laws, reliably enforce laws, educate 
its population or perform sensible land reform would reap the fruits of this labour, 
irrespective of its colonial origin and religious makeup.  Indeed, some countries of 
French legal origins have reformed their commercial laws and found that this led to 
improvements in financial development. Men can make their own history even if not in 
circumstances of their making. 
The collective noun “men” in the previous sentence of course includes women too 
as is standard in English usage.  But there are instances where women’s involvement is 
particularly important.  Swamy, et al. (2001) have found that women disapprove of 
corruption more than men in most countries, and that countries where women are more 
engaged in market work and public life have lower levels of corruption.  Moreover, 
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empowering women at the level of the household leads to increases in expenditures on 
health and education, and this may also be true at the level of government.  
Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2005) have found that Indian localities with women policy-
makers are more likely to provide public goods that women want.  Mala Htun has found 
that female parliamentarians in Argentina are more likely to be members of health and 
education committees and introduce legislation on health and education than men.  This 
suggests that societies should be able to leverage their existing civic virtue by removing 
the barriers that prevent women from engaging in public life.   
 
4.  POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: DEMOCRACY, THE SEPARATION OF 
POWERS, AND DECENTRALISATION 
I now turn to the second set of institutions in the schema: political institutions.  
Political institutions consist of the methods of selecting the government (dictatorships and 
democracies), the separation of powers within government (whether the executive, 
legislature and judiciary are separately elected and de facto independent of each other), the 
extent to which citizens can participate directly in rule making through referenda, how 
powers are assigned to federal and local governments, and the existence of a free press. 
The historical work of North (1983, 1990), Olson (1993) and others has argued 
that democracy creates the political foundations of secure property rights.  Indeed, it 
seems that democracy was created to protect the rights of merchants and nobles from 
expropriation by the king.  Citizens are likely to vote out a government that 
systematically violates property rights; indeed, no government facing democratic political 
disciplines has ever abolished private property.  Recent econometric work has shown that 
property rights are more secure in democracies than autocracies, and corruption levels are 
lower in stable democracies.1 
Besides the question of whether or not elections are held, there is the issue of how 
many elections are held.  Separate elections for the executive, legislature and even other 
branches of government like the attorney general may help keep governments honest.  
The introduction of the long ballot, where citizens directly choose a large number of 
public officials was part of the reform of local governments, which transformed local 
politics in America from generally dishonest to generally honest.  In almost all 
developing countries the attorney generals at all levels of government are appointed by 
the executive.  There, officials have—to put it politely—weak incentives to investigate 
the executive branch.  Corruption, which is a criminal charge, can only be prosecuted by 
the attorney general’s office in many countries and  consequently corruption cases against 
sitting governments are rare.  In the U.S., by contrast, 44 out of 50 states have directly 
elected attorney generals.  These officers are not beholden to the executive branch and 
may even have positive incentives in terms of their political careers to successfully 
conduct high-profile investigations.  Once cases have been filed and facts found at the 
local level, even a politically appointed attorney general in the federal government can 
not allow cases to be properly prosecuted in federal court.  In an experimental analysis 
Azfar and Nelson (2007) do find that directly elected attorney generals are more vigilant 
than appointed attorney generals. 
 
1Clague, et al. (1996), Treisman (1999). 
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In many countries, powers are not even separated between the executive and the 
legislature.  In Indonesian local elections circa 2000, citizens only voted for a party, the 
party has a list of candidates who got a seat in the council depending on their order on the 
party list and the fraction of votes their party got.  The party list could be changed after 
the election!  When the members of the council finally took their seats, they voted for the 
mayor (Bupati).  Reports suggested that each stage of this process is corrupt: would-be 
councilmen paid for positions on party lists, would-be mayors bribed councilmen for 
votes.  Such practices were so prevalent that the Indonesians have coined a word for 
them: “money-politics”.  There were also reports of other forms of legislative corruption, 
in voting for laws and in voting on the budget.  Citizens felt disconnected from 
government as they never voted for any one person they could hold accountable.  Survey 
results indicated that Indonesians would not vote for the same mayor the local council 
elected and that they thought that the quality of government service would improve if the 
Bupati was directly elected [Azfar (2002)].  Eventually the system was reformed and 
direct elections were introduced.     
Improprieties in campaign finance are a frequent and serious cause of 
misgovernance.  The problem lies in the choice between privately financed campaigns, 
which lead to unsavory quid pro quos, and publicly financed campaigns which would 
favour the incumbent.  The solution may lie in a system of electoral lotteries, financed by 
the government which combine the ability of the market to gather information and the 
ability of the public sector to raise revenues.  The government could put up a certain 
amount of prize money and offer lottery tickets for various candidates, which could be 
redeemed if the specified candidate won the election.  As an illustrative example for the 
U.S., the U.S. government could auction off lotteries worth $ 100,000,000 a month 
starting a year before the election.  The sum total of costs would be $1.2 Billion, which is 
small change for the U.S. treasury.  The price of the lottery tickets would signal that 
people thought there was a non-trivial probability the person would win the election, or 
perhaps that people support the candidate and are buying the lottery tickets as a form of 
contributing to the campaign.  To prevent prices being set by a few players in the market, 
the government could limit the number of lottery tickets any one individual could buy at 
$1000.  Thus the price would reflect the probability that the 100,000th buyer placed on 
the candidate (if buyers were ordered by the prices they were willing to pay).  With an 
appropriate cap the money raised by the sales of tickets for the candidate would go to the 
candidate.  The auctions would generate much interest in the press and financial markets 
and might actually help citizens focus on politics.  The sums of money involved for other 
countries would be much smaller and the period over which the auctions are conducted 
would also typically be shorter in line with the shorter campaign periods in developing 
countries.  
Another important dimension of political design is the extent to which powers are 
concentrated in central or local governments.  The political experience of the United 
States gives cause to be hopeful for local government.  Citizens are interested in local 
politics, they follow local news and vote in local elections.  Labour and capital are mobile 
across jurisdictions, keeping local governments honest and efficient.  However, these 
political disciplines appear to be weak in the developing countries we have studied 
[Azfar, Gurgur, and Meagher (2004), Azfar, Livingston, and Meagher (2006)]. In 
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Uganda, a majority (70 percent) of citizens rely on community leaders for their 
information on local politics which may weaken political disciplines on local 
government.  In the Philippines too, far more people use officials as a source of their 
news on local politics than is the case for national politics. In both countries, broadcast 
media is a more important source of information on politics than print, which indicates 
that the independence of the broadcast media is at least as important as the freedom of the 
press.  In both countries, the propensity to vote and the reasons for voting are no better 
for local politics than for national politics.  Cross-jurisdictional mobility is not driven by 
service provision in either country.  In developing countries it seems that the presumptive 
political disciplines that are supposed to keep local governments honest are weak or 
absent.  Indeed, of the 336 corruption cases in the Philippines current in mid-2000, nearly 
half (49 percent) were against municipal mayors [Batalla (2000)]. 
Another piece of evidence suggesting the newfound enthusiasm towards 
decentralisation may be misplaced is that cross-country regressions on the link between 
decentralisation and corruption fail to find consistent results.  Fisman and Gatti (2000) 
find that countries where sub-national governments control a larger share of expenditure 
are less corrupt, but they acknowledge this could be driven by reverse causality, as the 
central governments in highly corrupt countries are unlikely to devolve expenditure 
authority to local governments.  Treisman (1999), using a typology created by political 
scientists ranking some states as federal and others as unitary, finds that federal states are 
more corrupt.   
Theoretical results on decentralisation are even more pessimistic. Bradhan and 
Mookherjee (1998) have pointed out that local governments may be more susceptible to 
capture by elites.  Anyone familiar with the politics of rural Sindh would recognise their 
concerns.  Moreover, vertical externalities between overlapping levels of government can 
increase public expropriation of the private sector to truly inefficient levels, as each level 
of government tries to maximise its take from the private economy.  Azfar and McGuire 
(2002) have shown that even devolving authority from a rapacious autocracy to perfectly 
democratic local governments may not improve outcomes, because the central 
government would be so intrusive that the democratic local government would 
voluntarily decide not to engage in economic activity.   
One caveat is in order.  Decentralisation has greatly increased the contestability of 
political markets at the national level.  Since the early 1990s as the pace of 
decentralisation has accelerated, the number of capital city mayors and governors of large 
provinces that are credibly competing with incumbents for the presidency has 
dramatically increased.  This just might lead to great improvements in the quality of 
governance, but is currently an understudied and poorly understood phenomenon. 
One possible policy implication of the findings of the questionable impacts of 
decentralisation is to urge caution on the pace and extent of decentralisation.  Another is 
to provide technical assistance on building institutions that are complementary to 
decentralised governance.  These include the development of human and physical 
capacity in local governments, the development of good accounting systems in local 
governments, the development of capacity in the local media and NGOs to monitor local 
governments, and systemising the use of surveys to elicit information on the needs of 
citizens and their rating of local government performance.   
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5.  LEGAL INSTITUTIONS: LAWS AND THEIR ENFORCEMENT 
The two fundamental theorems of welfare economics state that markets can 
achieve Pareto-efficient outcomes and that any Pareto-efficient allocation of goods can be 
achieved by some initial distribution followed by trade.  These are powerful results 
which, when contrasted with the inefficiencies of state-led development, provide strong 
arguments for markets.  It is now increasingly well understood how these theorems in 
fact provide an important positive role for the state.  It is, after all, trade that is both 
voluntary and reliable which leads to these efficient outcomes.  In the absence of the 
protection of property rights, many exchanges would not take place and markets would 
remain primitive and stunted.  Reliable law enforcement is an important, indeed essential, 
public good that the state must provide to encourage economic development. 
Phrased differently, the rule of law—which means that the rights and privileges 
citizens are clearly defined, impartially interpreted, and consistently enforced—is 
important to encourage economic activity.  Creating the rule of law, however, is a non-
trivial task.  The actual demands on a legal system before it can reasonably be said to be 
governed by “the rule of law” are sophisticated and complex.2   
Of all laws, commercial laws, which lay the foundation for the development of 
capital markets, are perhaps the most relevant to NIE.  Commercial laws include 
collateral laws—which define the relationships between lenders and borrowers in debt 
markets—and corporate laws—which define the rights of shareholders in equity markets.  
Collateral laws and corporate laws are important for augmenting the markets for loans 
and equity, respectively [Azfar and Matheson (1999), Levine (1999)].  Perhaps even 
more important than specific laws is the quality of law enforcement.  In all likelihood it is 
the enforcement of good commercial laws, rather than their mere existence, which 
encourages lenders to trust others with their money.  Without the basics of law 
enforcement, merchants would even be reluctant to engage in spot transactions and fear 
for their very lives.  Both good laws and their reliable enforcement are needed to augment 
markets.  Indeed, law enforcement had a much larger effect on the development of capital 
markets than commercial law, and law enforcement has an independent effect on 
economic growth as well as an effect through the development of capital markets.3   
“Justice delayed is justice denied” is an insightful aphorism on the needs for 
efficient justice.  One of the most important weaknesses of many judicial systems is the 
years and even decades it can take for cases to be decided.  Delays in justice in India are 
connected with poor economic performance and persistent poverty.  I know anecdotally 
from Pakistan that land and rental markets are particularly badly affected by slow-moving 
justice.  While focus has shifted to improving the speed of judicial decisions, the 
engineering approach taken by the “helicopter drops” of computers and equipment misses 
out on the perverse incentives of the participants: litigants who do not want cases decided 
and bribe judges to delay judgements, lawyers who are paid by court appearance, and so 
on.  Legal reforms that placed limits on the numbers of adjournments and reasons for 
adjournment might have a larger impact on improving the speed of justice.    
The direction of causality between legal and political development may not be 
unidirectional.  If, for instance, corruption or malfeasance prevents elections from being 
 
2Summers (2002) lists 18 requirements that must be satisfied by a law-based legal system. 
3See Azfar and Matheson (1999). 
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fair even if they are nominally free, a society cannot be properly democratic.  Just as 
contested political markets may underlie the rule of law, reliable law enforcement may 
underlie genuinely contested political markets.  Similarly, the absence of the rule of law 
can allow the harassment of members of the opposition—and in systems with the 
separation of powers, of other branches of government.  In Russia, for example, judges 
who attempt to circumscribe the actions of the government find their electricity supply 
becomes strangely unreliable.  More generally, in societies where the quality of public 
services is uncertain and people rely on personal favours, the government can unduly 
influence people in the media, judiciary and opposition and undermine the effectiveness 
of formally democratic institutions. 
Corruption—often defined as the abuse of office for personal gain—has 
significant overlap with poor law enforcement.  There was for a long time heated debate 
about whether corruption helped or hindered development.  Famous political scientists 
like Huntington (1968) and Leff (1964) argued that in the absence of corruption there 
would be even more severe constraints on commerce.  In an article entitled “Economic 
development through bureaucratic corruption” Leff wrote “the only thing worse than a 
corrupt over-centralised bureaucracy is an honest over-centralised bureaucracy.”  Myrdal 
(1968) provided an early dissent from this position, arguing that corruption undermines 
the positive role a state must play in development, and that one of the causes of over-
regulation may be corruption itself.  After serious empirical work began on corruption in 
the 1990s, economists have converged to Myrdal’s position. For instance, Lee and Azfar 
(2007) have shown that trade restrictions are more persistent in countries with high levels 
of corruption.  The emerging consensus is that corruption does in fact undermine 
economic development.4  
There is significant conceptual overlap as well as causal interactions between 
corruption and other dimensions of misgovernance.  As a practical matter this makes it 
difficult to trace the cause of some poor socio-economic outcome back to corruption 
rather than to some other form of misgovernance.  Corruption levels are highly correlated 
(inversely) with bureaucratic quality and the rule of law, which makes it difficult to 
identify which aspect of misgovernance is the culprit.  However, because causal links 
between corruption and other kinds of poor governance—like poor bureaucratic quality—
are both presumptively likely and occasionally even empirically identified—for instance 
if hiring is done on the basis of bribes not merit—it may be reasonable to state that 
corruption is responsible for some socio-economic pathology, even if the effect of 
corruption on the relevant outcome cannot be econometrically disentangled from other 
measures of governance. 
This brings us to the question of how we might reduce corruption, or more 
generally how we might create the rule of law in developing countries.  These are 
difficult questions.  The reform of actual laws is relatively easy, the creation of the rule of 
law much more difficult though probably more useful.   
 
4See Azfar, Lee and Swamy (2001) for a review.  Corruption has been shown to lead to lower 
investment [Mauro (1995)], slower growth [Knack and Keefer (1995)], misallocated resources [Mauro (1998)], 
poorer health and education outcomes [Gupta, et al. (2000) and Azfar and Gurgur (2001)], and more restrictions 
on international trade [Lee and Azfar (2001)]. 
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Yet the beginnings of an understanding to these difficult questions are beginning 
to emerge.  Stable democracies lead to more secure property rights and lower levels of 
corruption.5  The separation of powers between the law enforcement branch of 
government and the executive may also reduce corruption.  The random allocation of 
judges and prosecutors to cases, may make it more difficult for systemic corruption to get 
gelled into place [Azfar (2006)]. The rule of law can be improved by several mechanisms 
like the dissemination of laws in the press and on the internet, by allowing parties to 
agree to binding arbitration and private repossession of property following court 
judgments, and by restricting the reasons for granting adjournments of court cases.  
Deregulation and simplifying licensing procedures which remove the leverage to demand 
bribes may reduce corruption.  Clear expenditure tracking from the central government, 
through local governments all the way down to delivery points appears to reduce 
corruption [Reinikka and Svensson (2002)], and the use of report cards on local 
governments may improve their performance [Paul (1994)].   
 
6.  PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS: DEALING WITH TRANSACTION COSTS 
IN INCOMPLETE CONTRACT, PRINCIPAL AGENT, AND 
ADVERSE SELECTION PROBLEMS 
Perhaps the most interesting advances in economic theory have been on 
understanding how organisations try to minimise transactions costs (asymmetric 
information and the administrative costs of dealing with asymmetric information).  We 
consider two such problems: the “principal-agent problem”; and the adverse selection 
problem.   
The principal-agent problem refers to the problem of motivating an agent to take a 
particular action when the action is not observable.  In broad terms, there are two kinds of 
principal agent problems.  Both kinds of principal agent problem do not allow the 
principal to observe the agents action, however there are important differences in the 
outcomes the principal can observe:  In the first kind of problem the principal can 
observe what he truly cares about—how many shoes are sold- and incentives can closely 
replicate first best outcomes; In the second kind of problem the principal cannot observe 
what he truly cares about—critical thinking- but only something correlated to it—test 
scores-. In this case incentives can be counterproductive distracting agents from what 
they would best be doing. 
The analysis of the principal-agent problem started with the first kind of problem.  
The predictions of the theory were optimistic and counterfactual.  Not only could the 
principal induce the agent to take the correct action, he could do it at essentially no extra 
cost—compared to the situation where the principal could directly observe the action.  
These predictions were due to the artificial simplicity of the models.  Indeed, this was 
acknowledged early on, but the most useful insights were to come later. 
Later analyses of the principal agent problem began with the demonstration that in 
more complex environments, incentives actually had to be more simple to prevent the 
agent “gaming” the incentive scheme [Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987, 1991)].  
Incentives could depend linearly on outcomes—like shoe salesmen paid a fixed wage—
 
5
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but not be much more complex; and incentives could only be contingent on something 
closely related to—but not identical to—the principal’s true interests.  In addition to this 
need for simple incentive schemes, the outcome the principal truly cares about—critical 
thinking—is not observable.  The implications of these analyses are less optimistic and 
suggested incentives are a two-edged sword.  Motivating teachers by making pay 
contingent on test scores may make them work harder at improving test scores, but such 
incentives would distract them from more valuable tasks like teaching children to think 
critically or imbuing them with civic virtue.  They might even let students cheat [Jacob 
and Levitt (2003)].  The suggestion of the newer multi-tasking literature on incentives 
seems to be “weak incentives may be useful, and should be based on as broad a set of 
outputs as possible—use several different types of test scores, on different subjects etc.—
but as long as the true objective—critical thinking, civic virtue—is not observable, sharp 
incentives may be distracting rather than useful”. 
In the adverse selection problem, the agent’s type (or the type of project the agent 
is involved in) is unknown.  The idea now is to select trustworthy agents, or agents who 
would undertake profitable projects, to work with.  This point was first made with respect 
to the market for used cars (lemons) by George Akerloff, for which he received the Nobel 
Prize in 2001.  The problem applies to many different markets, here, we will discuss two: 
credit markets and labour markets.   
Suppose, for instance, that there were two kinds of agents, one who would like to 
invest in a relatively safe project with positive expected payoffs, and one type who would 
like to invest in risky projects with negative expected payoffs.  A banker in such a market 
may not find it worthwhile to lend at all.  Indeed, before institutional innovations in the 
forms of lending started with the micro-finance revolution, lending to entrepreneurs in 
developing countries was risky business. 
A Bangladeshi economist Mohammed Younis thought up a way to resolve the 
adverse selection problem, and won the Nobel Peace Prize as a consequence.  If borrowers 
were obliged to borrow in groups, and the entire group suffered from the default of one 
member, then borrowers would only agree to form groups with others who they knew were 
safe bets.  Thus, as long as borrowers knew each other better than loan officers could be 
expected to, loans would be taken but only used for safe and profitable projects. 
 
Fig. 2.  Micro-finance: Transaction Costs and Institutional Solutions 
Problem Moral Hazard 
Borrowers are careless or chose risky 
projects 
Adverse Selection 
Some borrowers only have access to 
risky investments 
Solution Dynamic incentives 
Improved access to credit in the future 
for borrowers who repaid the first 
loans on time provides incentives to 
not be careless, rash or lazy 
Insisting on group lending means such 
borrowers will typically not be 
allowed into groups, and hence not 
able to borrow 
 
In addition to using group lending for selecting trustworthy borrowers, micro-
finance programmes also used “dynamic incentives” to induce borrowers to work harder 
and improve the chances of success of their projects.  Dynamic incentives take the form 
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of improved access to credit after successful repayments in early rounds.  Because of 
group lending, which mitigates the adverse selection problem, and dynamic incentives, 
which combat the moral hazard problem, micro-finance programmes have had high 
repayment rates.  Yet they are often not profitable, because of administrative costs, and 
once the administrative costs are accounted for it is not clear how cost-effective they are 
[Morduch (1999), and Montgomery and Weiss (2005)] contains an excellent survey of 
the micro-finance experience). 
 
7.  CONCLUSION 
What in conclusion does NIE teach the development professional?  The main 
lesson of NIE for development assistance might be that aligning the incentives of agents 
with the interests of principals, and improving information flows about actions and 
outputs can improve outcomes.  This applies to principal-agent relationships in both the 
political sphere (voter-prime minister-civil servant) and the economic sphere (creditor-
debtor, shareholder-manager).  It also applies to clear property rights which give private 
agents sharp incentives to minimise on costs while maintaining quality. 
 In the political sphere regular and genuinely contested elections, and a free press 
that keeps the population relatively well-informed, align the incentives of politicians with 
the interests of voters.  Other details of the political system, especially the separation of 
powers and democracy within political parties, are also important. 
In the private economic sphere, collateral laws that clearly state creditors should be 
paid back in the order in which they lent may help improve the functioning of debt 
markets.  Corporate laws that give shareholders control rights in proportion to their 
holdings might help the development of equity markets.  Paying workers and managers in 
proportion to the profitability of the firm also appears to motivate employees.  If designed 
with care, some form of output-based compensation may even improve the performance 
of school teachers and other public sector employees. 
I conclude with a disclaimer about the limits of what NIE can help us do.  
Incentives are not a panacea and explicit incentives are not always appropriate.  Truly 
valuable outcomes are often not observable, and using imperfect proxies for these 
outcomes can sometimes be distracting rather than useful.  Finally, NIE ca not help us 
change human nature.  Rather than try to build social capital in societies with problematic 
social structures, or transplanting developed-country institutions in technically more 
backward societies, NIE suggests we would be better off trying to design political and 
legal institutions suited to current realities. 
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Appendix 
Glossary of Terms 
Principal-agent problem refers to any situation in which the agent who is 
supposed to be serving the interests of the principal finds its not in his interest to do.  The 
solution to a principal agent problem is to provide the agent with incentives to align his 
interests with those of the principal. 
Moral hazard, refers to a class of principal agent problems.  Moral hazard arises 
in a situation where the agent bears little consequence from his actions and may be 
careless and endanger his interests and those of others. Examples are fire insurance and 
insuring bank deposits.  The term moral hazard is sometimes used by economists to refer 
to a broader class of principal agent problems more precisely referred to as “hidden 
action” problems, where the principal cannot observe the agents action.  
Adverse selection problems refer to situations where one party to a transaction 
cannot observe the value of the good or service being transacted.  They are sometimes 
referred to as “hidden value” problems.  The classic example is the market for “lemons” 
(used cars) where the market may remain sub-optimally small because buyers do not trust 
sellers. 
The hold-up problem or incomplete contracts problem refers to the 
inefficiencies created by two parties to a contract being unable to observe the quality of 
goods they would have to trade in the future for present day investments to be 
worthwhile.  The inability to measure quality can make long-term contracts impractical 
and discourage present day investment. 
Incomplete contracts refers to situations when important variables to a 
transaction cannot be verified by courts and so cannot be usefully included in a contract.  
In some such situations reconfiguring rights to profits from the collective enterprise can 
resolve the incomplete contracts problem. 
Information asymmetries arise when one party to a transaction has more 
information on important factors than other parties. Information asymmetries can refer to 
both “hidden action” and “hidden value” problems. 
Transaction costs include—but are not limited to—information asymmetries, and 
the administrative costs of mitigating the problems created by informational 
asymmetries.  
Property rights include the rights of control and sale of assets. Principal agent 
problems arise when those who control an asset—managers—are not the same as those 
who own the rights of sale—shareholders.  
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